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Abstract 
 
There has been a remarkable increase in wage inequality in the US, UK and many 
other countries over the past three decades. A significant part of this appears to be 
within observable groups (such as age-gender-skill cells). A generally untested 
implication of many theories rationalizing the growth of within-group inequality is 
that firm-level productivity dispersion should also have increased. Since the relevant 
data do not exist in the US we utilize a UK longitudinal panel dataset covering the 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors since the early 1980s. We find 
evidence that productivity inequality has increased. Existing studies have 
underestimated this phenomenon because they use manufacturing data where which 
has shrunk rapidly. Most of the increase in individual wage inequality has occurred 
because of an increase in inequality between firms (and within industries). Increased 
productivity dispersion appears to be linked with new technologies as suggested by 
models such as Caselli (1999) and is not primarily due to an increase in transitory 
shocks, greater sorting or entry/exit dynamics.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Wage inequality has increased substantially in the United States and the United 
Kingdom in the last thirty years. Acemoglu (2002) reports that the difference in wages 
earned by a worker in the 90th percentile of the wage distribution compared to a 
worker in the 10th percentile increased by 40% in the US from 1971 to 1995. For the 
UK, the 90-10 differential increased by 48% from 1975 to 2000 (see Machin, 2003; 
Machin and Van Reenen, 2007). Increases in within-group inequality, i.e. increases in 
inequality among observationally equivalent workers, account for a significant 
proportion of the rise1. 
Many theories have been proposed to explain the rise in wage inequality. 
These include demand-side explanations (trade with developing countries or 
technological change)2, supply-side explanations (changes in the relative supply of 
highly-educated workers across cohorts)3 and institutions (decline in union power 
and/or the minimum wage4). Technology-based theories have proven popular in 
explaining the within group rise. They generally assume some type of labor market 
friction whereby workers’ wages are linked with the productivity of the worker-firm 
match. Such effects arise naturally in search based models of equilibrium wage 
dispersion, but there are other theoretical foundations based on bargaining that 
                                                 
1 Lemieux (2006) argues that the scale of this increase may have been exaggerated in some early 
studies due to compositional effect. Autor et al. (2005) still find a substantial within component 
especially in the upper tail of the distribution. 
2 See, among others, Machin and Van Reenen (1998) and Autor et al. (1998) for evidence that the rapid 
spread of computers has increased the demand for skills. See, among many others, Caselli (1999), 
Aghion et al. (2004) and Violante (2002) for models in which rapid technical change increases the 
demand for skills and causes a rise in inequality. 
3 See Card and Lemieux, 2001. 
4 Differences in labor market institutions are often proposed to explain cross-country inequality (e.g. 
Blau and Kahn, 1996). Unions have declined just about everywhere and in the US the real value of the 
minimum wage fell substantially until the mid 1990s (see, e.g., DiNardo et al., 1996).  
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generate similar implications5. When a “general purpose technology” like information 
and communication technologies (ICT) becomes available, firms will adopt 
technologies at different rates and be successful to different degrees. This generates 
increased wage dispersion even for observationally identical workers (e.g. Violante, 
2002; Aghion et al., 2002, 2004). An under-appreciated implication of these models is 
that they imply that productivity dispersion between firms should also have risen. 
Unfortunately, very little is known about the evolution of the productivity 
distribution. Wages are not a sufficient statistic for productivity once we move away 
from the simplest models of spot competition in labor markets. Some authors have 
examined in detail the determinants of the cross sectional distribution of productivity 
and others have decomposed aggregate productivity growth into incumbent firm 
productivity growth and reallocation effects driven by entry, exit and the relative 
growth of more productive firms. This literature strongly suggests that the between 
firm effects (ignored by representative agent models) are very important6. As useful 
as this literature is, however, it has generally focused on explaining the evolution of 
the first moment of the productivity distribution and has not focused on how the 
higher order moments of the productivity distribution have evolved over time. 
Understanding the dynamics of productivity dispersion is the main contribution of this 
paper. 
Data constraints are an important reason why the changing productivity 
distribution is under-studied. In order to examine secular changes, a long time series 
                                                 
5 Mortensen (2003) and Postal-Viney and Robin (2003) contain theoretical models linking equilibrium 
wages with employer heterogeneity in productivity. They use these models to structurally estimate the 
cross sectional wage distribution in Denmark and France, respectively. Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(2005) show how the link between workers wages and employer productivity can arise across a range 
of models – union bargaining, efficiency wage, rent-sharing and search-based. 
6 For the cross sectional dispersion of productivity see among others Haltiwanger et al. (1999) for the 
U.S. and Martin (2004) for the UK. For decompositions of productivity changes see among others, 
Bailey et al. (1992), Olley and Pakes (1996) and Bartelsman et al. (2005). 
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of data is needed and firm-level data is usually only available for such periods on the 
manufacturing sector7. Since this sector only now employs about 14% of the British 
workforce and 13% of the American workforce, it is problematic to extrapolate to the 
whole economy from just manufacturing industries. It is particularly a problem for 
productivity analysis as the rapid decline in manufacturing in the OECD over the last 
three decades is partly due to increased competition from less developed countries 
with much lower labor costs. With heterogeneous firms, increases in competition will 
generally lower the productivity dispersion (see Syverson, 2004, for a model and 
empirical evidence confirming the importance of this intuition). Consequently, the 
existing studies of the change in productivity dispersion may have seriously 
underestimated the importance of the growth of productivity inequality. Although 
production data on non-manufacturing is available in the US in Compustat, this only 
includes firms listed on the Stock Market. Since most firms are private, an analysis of 
productivity inequality that ignored these unlisted firms is unconvincing8. The new 
US Longitudinal Business Database is available for non-manufacturing firms in the 
US, but it does not contain data on sales or capital (see Davis et a.l, 2006). 
To tackle these data constraints we use the UK as a test bed – wage inequality 
has risen rapidly since the early 1980s and we use a data source (FAME) covering 
listed and unlisted firms in both manufacturing and service sectors. This is an 
unbalanced panel and is available since the early 1980s.   
 Figure 5a shows the headline finding from this data where we look at the 
firm-specific distribution of labor productivity measured by value added per worker. 
We will discuss more data details later in the paper (e.g. see Table A1 for levels of 
                                                 
7 See Dunne et al. (2004) for the US and Haskel and Martin (2002) for the UK.  
8 For example, several papers have argued that there is an increase in the dispersion of firm-specific 
shocks over time as the variation of firm sales growth in Compustat appears to have increased (e.g. 
Comin and Philippon, 2005). Unfortunately, this does not seem to be generally true across the US 
economy (see Davis et al., 2006). 
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productivity dispersion). We consider the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the log 
(labor productivity) distribution where we normalize these values to unity in 1984, so 
the lines show what has happened to growth at each of these percentiles. The data 
reveal a dramatic growth in the dispersion of productivity between firms. Productivity 
increased by 60 log points at the 90th percentile between 1984 and 2001 whereas it 
increased by only 20 log points at the 10th percentile (there was a growth of around 40 
log points at the median). This is a substantial increase in productivity inequality and 
we investigate in detail the cause of this change in this paper.  We report three major 
findings. 
First, using individual and firm level data we find that the vast majority of the 
increase in individual wage inequality in the UK is a between-firm (rather than 
within-firm) phenomenon9. This implies that understanding the evolution of the 
between firm productivity distribution may be critical in understanding the between 
firm wage distribution and therefore the overall wage distribution (we also show that 
the correlation between wages and productivity has become more important over 
time). Furthermore, the vast majority of the growth of wage and productivity 
dispersion is within industries, suggesting industry level data on productivity and 
wages will not be able to identify the causes of the changes.  
Second, we show that the increase in the productivity dispersion (as with the 
wage dispersion) is mainly in the service sector of the economy suggesting that the 
focus on manufacturing in the existing literature has indeed underestimated the rise of 
economy wide productivity inequality. 
                                                 
9 This is interesting as it suggests the media-grabbing attention attached to CEO pay relative to workers 
pay in the same firm may be misplaced, as the overall increase in inequality has relatively little to do 
with this. Nevertheless, we are not including many components of CEO remuneration such as share 
options that are important. 
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Third, we show that the increase in labor productivity dispersion is mainly 
driven by an increase in total factor productivity dispersion (rather than being due to 
just an increase in the dispersion of capital-labor ratios or greater sorting as in Kremer 
and Maskin, 1996). This suggests technological differences may be driving our results 
as suggested in the theories of in Caselli (1999) or Acemoglu et al (2001)10. We 
present some direct evidence in line with this idea by using ICT data to explain the 
increase in within industry productivity dispersion. We also examine (and reject) 
other possible explanations including increasing a greater incidence of transitory 
shocks, differential entry/exit rates, institutional changes and/or measurement error.  
To our knowledge, there are only two studies that have looked at changes in 
productivity dispersion across many sectors. Dunne et al (2004) analyse changes in 
the distribution of firm productivity across US plants. They show that inequality of 
plant wages and productivity dispersion increased between 1975 and 1992 and much 
of this was a between-plant phenomenon (this is consistent with what we find below 
for the UK). Haskel and Martin (2002) examined changes in labor productivity in UK 
establishments (the Annual Business Inquiry Respondents’ Database) and also found 
some increase in dispersion. We argue that since both of these earlier studies look 
only at the manufacturing sector they have seriously underestimated the magnitude of 
the change. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the 
theoretical framework and Section 3 details the data sources we use. Section 4 
describes the main results and Section 5 discusses what could explain the trends 
observed in the data. Section 6 offers some concluding comments. 
                                                 
10 Acemoglu et al (2001) present a model where skill biased technical change causes deunionization. 
This amplifies the direct effect of technology to further increase wage inequality. We investigate 
institutional change and unionisation directly in sub-section 5.4. and 5.5. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
In this section, we use the papers by Caselli (1999) and Kremer and Maskin 
(1996) to generate some empirical predictions regarding the distribution of wages and 
productivity. Caselli (1999) models the impact of a technological “revolution” on the 
dispersion of wages and productivity. In the Caselli model, there is a distribution of 
worker types and machine types and operating a given type of machine requires a 
given type of skill. The cost of learning a skill varies across workers and is lower for 
more skilled workers and a technology is a combination of workers of type i who 
have the appropriate skills to operate machines of type i. A technological “revolution” 
occurs with the introduction of a new type of machine. Since workers of different 
abilities are distributed heterogeneously across firms and for each period firms 
consider as given the skill composition of their workforce, there will be differential 
adoption of new technology by firms. High-skill workers will tend to use the new 
technologies since it is less costly for them to acquire the new skills.  
This model has at least three implications that are relevant for our empirical 
analysis. Firstly, we will expect increased wage dispersion between (and within) 
firms11. Secondly, labor productivity (value added per worker) dispersion increases 
between firms due to the fact that more skilled workers are now more productive. 
Thirdly, since capital is also reallocated to its best use total factor productivity 
increases in firms that introduce a new technology so Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
dispersion also rises.  
It is worth noting that the Caselli model is different from a pure sorting model 
where between firm wage (and labor productivity) dispersion could rise because 
                                                 
11 There are two effects in operation: a direct effect and an indirect effect. The wages of high-skill 
workers rise because they now operate on more productive machines (the direct effect). There is also a 
reallocation of capital away from old technologies towards new technologies, depressing the wages of 
the low skilled and benefiting the wages of the high skilled (the indirect effect). 
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“good” workers tend to cluster in one type of firm and “bad” workers cluster in 
another. Kremer and Maskin (1996) present an example of such a model that accounts 
for the simultaneous existence of increased wage inequality and increased segregation 
of workers by skill. They introduce a set of specific assumptions regarding the firm 
organisational structure: imperfect substitution of workers of different skills; 
complementarity of tasks within a plant, and differential effects of a worker skill 
depending on the task performed. Under this set of assumptions and further assuming 
a rise in the dispersion of skills across workers, Kremer and Maskin derive an 
equilibrium solution where low-skill workers are sorted in low-productivity plants 
and high-skill workers sorted in high-productivity plants (i.e. sorting or segregation). 
Therefore, if dispersion of skills has increased due to increased educational inequality 
for example, this could lead to increased sorting12. 
This model predicts an increase in the dispersion of wages across firms. There 
will also be an increase in the dispersion of labor productivity because skilled workers 
will be segregated into different firms. However, unlike technology-based models like 
Caselli’s, because increased wage and productivity dispersion is due to sorting there 
should be no effect on total factor productivity dispersion. We therefore look 
explicitly at TFP as well as labor productivity and wages to distinguish between the 
two approaches. 
                                                 
12 In this model the degree of asymmetry/complementarity of tasks within a plant is crucial in shaping 
the distribution of workers across plants. The asymmetry of tasks in the production function favours 
cross-matching across workers (less segregation). Conversely, the complementarity of tasks favours 
self-matching (more segregation). Workers of different abilities will be cross-matched up to the point at 
which differences in skills or abilities are so great that segregation will be inevitable. If the distribution 
of skills is sufficiently compressed, cross-matching seems to be the most probable outcome. If the 
distribution of skills is dispersed, self-matching or sorting workers by skill will prevail. This gives 
some ambiguity to the predictions as although the level of educational achievement has risen over time, 
it is less clear whether educational inequality has risen. 
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3. Data description 
All datasets are described in detail in the Appendix B. The main dataset we 
use is FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) which is a UK company-level panel 
data set available since 1982. In Britain, all incorporated companies are legally 
required to register their accounts at Companies’ House and given a unique (VAT) 
registration number. Unlike the US, this includes not only companies listed on the 
Stock Exchange (which are held on databases such as COMPUSTAT) but also all 
unlisted companies. In 2003, we arranged a special purchase of this data with a 
private sector company that has converted this data into electronic form. This is 
unbalanced panel data and includes all firms that had exited the database prior to 2003 
(by either bankruptcy or takeover)13.  
In our main analysis, we drop some firms. In general, this could lead to 
selection bias causing us to find smaller or greater increases in inequality over time, 
we argue in Appendix B that these biases are not generally large by checking the 
sensitivity of the results to including the dropped observations and using 
complementary datasets (contrast Figures 5a and 5b to see that these exclusions have 
little effect on the overall trends). Firstly, we drop firms with less than ten employees 
because small firms are not required to report certain key variables we need for our 
analysis such as the wages bill. Secondly, we use the consolidated accounts of parent 
firms and drop the unconsolidated accounts of their subsidiaries. We would be double 
counting if we used both parents and subsidiaries. Because some subsidiaries are 
below ten employees, we would be missing parts of the economy if we just used 
subsidiaries. Thirdly, we start the sample in 1984 because sampling of FAME was not 
                                                 
13 Under UK law, firms are also required to report a great deal more accounting information on their 
wage bills than in the US (where declaration of staff expenses is a voluntary item). Because of this, we 
are able to construct measures of average firm wages that are unavailable for most firms in the US 
public accounts. 
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complete in the early 1980s. Finally, we generally drop certain sectors: agriculture, 
mining, utilities, health and education. We were concerned that these sectors were 
heavily influenced by state control for at least some of the sample period covered. We 
also drop the financial sector because of the well-known problems of measuring 
productivity in banking and insurance. 
Our final sample we use contains about 11,000 firms a year between 1984 and 
2001 (we cover about 13 million workers each year). We have information on a large 
number of variables. We use information on employment, capital, sales, total worker 
remuneration, gross profits and industry. Note that we do not have information on the 
demographics of the workforce or hours worked. But we investigate biases associated 
with this omission in sub-section 5.4. 
The main measure we use for labor productivity is value added per worker, but 
we also consider using sales per worker as an alternative. Sales has the advantage that 
it is reported as a line item in the accounts, but the major disadvantage is that it will 
be influenced by the purchase of intermediate inputs, so “labor productivity” could 
rise simply because a firm was buying more materials per worker – this will 
particularly be a problem in the service sector. We also examine total factor 
productivity (TFP) calculated in various ways. The main way we calculate TFP is as a 
residual of outputs from weighted inputs, but we also consider estimating firm 
production functions and using the estimated parameters to construct TFP measures. 
There are numerous well-known problems with measuring labor productivity 
and TFP. Some of these are discussed below (e.g. appropriate choice of weights). One 
issue is that the value added numerator is not measured in physical units so will 
reflect differential mark-ups among firms as well as physical productivity increases. 
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Thus, when we say productivity it is shorthand for “revenue productivity”14. This is 
still an interesting measure to look at as the ability of firms to sustain mark-ups is 
partly a reflection of product quality, and technological change may enable firms to 
improve quality (see Appendix B and Table A2 for an analysis of the changing 
variation in profitability). Undoubtedly, there are other sources of market power and 
the increased variation of market power could be a reason for increased measured 
productivity dispersion. We have reason to doubt this explanation, however, as 
competition has almost certainly increased over time in the UK due to waves of 
policy-driven liberalization and globalization of markets. Other things equal, this 
would lead to a reduction in productivity dispersion as the least efficient firms are 
driven from the market. 
The second dataset we use is the New Earnings Survey (NES) data which give 
consistent information on individual wages, and covers one per cent of the entire UK 
working population (those whose National Insurance/Social Security numbers end in 
the same two digits, 14). We currently have access to data for all years between 1975 
and 1999 in NES. We use annual gross pay as our measure of the wage in NES which 
matches most closely with FAME’s measure of annual staff costs. The FAME 
measure is higher on average because it includes the employers’ payroll taxes15.  
                                                 
14 We use an economy wide deflator, the Retail Price Index for value added. Industry-level deflators are 
available at a more disaggregated level for manufacturing and the results are robust to using these 
deflators. Industry-level deflators are not, however, available for the service sector (due to the difficulty 
of defining price). Since the comparison between manufacturing and services is important, we chose to 
report our main results using a common aggregate deflator. 
15 In FAME, we cannot distinguish employers’ payroll tax costs from total annual staff costs. 
Employers National Insurance is a relatively small part of total wage costs so it is unlikely this could 
account for an increase in dispersion. Nevertheless, we investigate this issue by looking at 
demographics (gender, age, part-time proportion, etc.). 
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4. The evolution of the wage and productivity distribution   
In this section we document the changes in wage (sub-section 4.1) and productivity 
(sub-section 4.2) dispersion. We then decompose the trends in sub-section 4.3. 
4.1. Trends in Wage Dispersion 
We begin by first examining wage trends with our data. Using individual data 
(NES) and firm level data (FAME), we compute log real annual wages for male 
workers aged 16-64. We compute values at the 90th, 50th (median) and 10th 
percentiles and normalise these to unity in 1984. The series therefore represent 
cumulative changes relative to the initial year, 198416. We split the sample by 
manufacturing and private services. Looking at private services first in Figure 1, 
wages at the 90th percentile increased by about forty log points between 1984 and 
1999. By contrast, the wage earned at the 10th percentile increased by only seventeen 
log points, thus generating an increase in the 90-10 differential of about twenty-three 
log points. The increase in inequality was stronger in the 1980s than in the 1990s. The 
picture does not fundamentally change when we restrict the sample to include only 
16-64 full-time17 male workers or measure earnings using hourly instead of annual 
wages (we are using annual wages so that we can compare these with FAME). Figure 
2 presents the equivalent changes for manufacturing. Although it is clear that wage 
inequality has also risen in this sector, the rise is much less dramatic than for services. 
Indeed, there is hardly any change at all in the 1990s. Studies focusing on 
manufacturing will therefore miss a large part of increased inequality. 
Figures 3 and 4 present similar evidence on wage dispersion using the FAME 
firm-level data. Recall that we are examining the distribution in the average firm wage 
(rather than individual wage) in these diagrams. Wage dispersion has risen for both 
                                                 
16  See Gosling et al (2000) for similar analyses from earlier time periods in the UK. 
17 As documented in Machin (2003), the NES data under-sample part-time low-wage individuals so 
focusing on full-time men eliminates a lot of this bias. 
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sectors, but again the rise is much stronger for services (Figure 3) than for 
manufacturing (Figure 4).  
Although the trend analysis is interesting, the samples are somewhat different 
– the NES figures cover men and all firms whereas the FAME figures cover all 
workers and only firms with more than 10 employees. Below in sub-section 5.3 we 
match the samples more exactly to estimate how much of the overall changes in 
individual wage variation are due to an increase in inter-firm wage dispersion 
compared to the intra-firm wage dispersion.  
4.2 Trends in the Productivity Dispersion 
We discussed the change in the overall productivity distribution briefly in the 
Introduction (Figure 5a). As with the wage distribution there was a substantial secular 
increase in productivity inequality 1984-2001. For example, comparing the 1984 to 
1989 average with the 1996 to 2001 average the 90-10 differential rose from 1.44 to 
1.71. Essentially, this is the main new “stylized fact” of the paper. Note that Figure 5a 
“Whole Economy” is the entire raw FAME data before we exclude particular 
industries and size classes discussed in the data section. The pattern is remarkably 
similar to Figure 5b “manufacturing and services” which is the sample after these 
selections have been made.  
In addition to the secular increase there is also an interesting cyclical pattern 
of productivity dispersion. There was an increase in productivity dispersion in the late 
1980s followed by a reduction during the recession of the early 1990s. Afterwards, 
productivity dispersion continued to increase until at least the year 2000. This pattern 
is consistent with the idea of the “cleaning effect of recessions” (e.g. Caballero and 
Hammour, 1994). The least productive firms are more likely to exit an industry (see 
the analysis of entry/exit in sub-section 5.3 below) and this effect is likely to be 
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particularly strong during cyclical downturns. Consequently the productivity 
distribution is compressed due to a truncation of the left tail in the early 1990s. Note 
that this selection effects implies that macro-economists are probably underestimating 
the degree of pro-cyclicality of productivity over the business cycle. 
 Increases in productivity dispersion for the whole economy are largely driven 
by increases in private services (see Figure 6). Productivity dispersion across UK 
manufacturing firms has increased, but to a much more limited extent (see Figure 7). 
The service sector also displays a stronger cyclical component in the variation of 
productivity, decreasing very strongly in the early 1990s recession. 
Overall, we find that the inter-firm productivity distribution has moved in a 
similar way to the inter-firm wage distribution over the last twenty years, suggesting 
that the two patterns may be linked. We explore this link in more detail in the next 
sub-section. 
4.3 Decomposing trends in wage and productivity inequality 
We first consider decomposing the overall increase in individual wage 
inequality into between firm and within firm components. We can further sub-divide 
the between firm component into a within and between industry component. We use 
comparable NES and FAME samples to accomplish this, so we restrict the NES 
sample in the same way we restricted the FAME sample (same industries, both male 
and female workers, both part-time and full-time workers, etc.).  
Our decomposition methodology follows Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) and 
Dunne et al. (2004). We use the NES data to estimate the overall variation of 
individual log wages denoted )( NESWV , and the FAME data to estimate the variance 
of between firm ln(wages) denoted )( FAMEWV . The within firm component denoted 
WFVˆ , is then the residual between the two series: 
 
 
15
)()(Wˆ NES FAMEWF WVVV −=                                                       (1) 
 
Details and further discussion of the decomposition methodology are in Appendix A. 
Figure 8 contains the first results of this decomposition. The bold line shows 
the total individual variation of ln(wages) between 1984 and 1999 which has 
increased by about 16 log points. This trend is well documented in several papers. The 
dashed line shows the “between” component (the inter-firm wage variation) and the 
dotted line the within firm component (the difference between overall wage 
dispersion and the between firm dispersion) over the same period. Looking first at the 
cross section in the 1980s, about half of the variation in wages is attributable to the 
variation within firms and half is between firms. The interesting aspect, however, is in 
the time series. The trend increase in between-firm wage variation is similar to the 
trend increase in the overall variation of wages. In fact, the between firm component 
essentially accounts for just about all of the increase in the growth of aggregate 
inequality (the within firm increase rises a little in the second half of the 1990s, but is 
essentially flat). 
Figure 9 takes this one stage further and decomposes the between firm 
variation into a between and within industry component. The between industry 
component has risen, but only by a minor amount. In short, the dominant reason for 
the increase in wage inequality appears to be the growth of inequality between firms 
within industries. This suggests that examining how firms’ productivity have changed 
over time could help account for the changing wage distribution as many of these 
recent theories by Caselli and others have suggested. Figures 10 through 13 show the 
breakdown between manufacturing and services to illustrate, as before, that the results 
are driven by the service sector. 
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We now turn to productivity again. Since productivity is a firm-level measure, 
we cannot look within firms, so our decompositions are into within and between 
industry components. We find a consistent picture that the increase in productivity 
inequality is a within industry phenomenon (Figure 14). There is only a small increase 
in the productivity dispersion between industries in services (Figure 15) and in 
manufacturing (Figure 16). One may be concerned that the industry decompositions 
are based on two digit sectors and this is too aggregated. We replicated the results on 
more finely disaggregated industries that lead to similar qualitative results18. 
 
5. Explaining the rising dispersion of productivity 
Our key finding is that there has been a secular increase in labor productivity 
dispersion in the UK.  We now seek to explain this by first showing that this is not 
simply due to an increase in dispersion of factor inputs (sub-section 5.1), in transitory 
shocks (sub-section 5.2) or in entry/exit behaviour (sub-section 5.3). We the present 
some direct evidence in line with the idea that information technology has an 
important role to play (sub-section 5.4). We end with some international evidence 
(sub-section 5.5) and some evidence on magnitudes (sub-section 5.6). 
5.1. Total Factor Productivity 
The main theories of within group wage inequality emphasise that there has 
been some increase in the technological heterogeneity between firms over time. We 
would expect this to be reflected in differences in total factor productivity (TFP). 
Labor productivity differences could arise from TFP differences, but could also arise 
from increases in the dispersion of capital intensity (fixed capital per worker) between 
firms. Of course, some of this increased capital heterogeneity could reflect 
                                                 
18 There is a trade-off here as the cell size per industry year used to construct the variance components 
is obviously rather small when we go to more disaggregated industries. 
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experimentation with different technologies (such as ICT). However, we would still 
expect some TFP differences (recall the discussion of Caselli’s model in Section 2). 
Theories of increased sorting (e.g. Kremer and Maskin, 1996), by contrast, do not 
have this implication. 
We can construct TFP in a number of ways. The basic method is the 
difference between weighted inputs and outputs. Measured TFP (MTFP) for firm j at 
time t is: 
 
(2) 
 
 
Where Qjt denotes value added, αj denotes the share of labor costs in output, Ljt 
denotes labor and Kjt  denotes the capital stock. This is the simplest method to 
compute TFP. There are more sophisticated ways19 to compute the parameters αj and 
to derive measures of TFP. We compute αj  as firm specific weights, i.e. αj is 
measured as the ratio of total wage bill over value added at the firm level and 
averaged over 1984-200120.  
 We start with analyzing the dispersion of capital intensity (in Figure 17).  
Although this has indeed risen over the period, it cannot fully account for the increase 
in the productivity dispersion, as TFP has risen significantly over this period as well 
                                                 
19 Griffith et al. (2004) discuss the methods common in the growth accounting literature. Direct 
estimation of the production by the methods of inter alia Olley and Pakes (1996) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) is another possibility.  
20 We also compared this with (i) imposing αj = 0.7, the typically value for labor’s share used in the 
literature on productivity and  (ii) estimating αj as industry specific weights, i.e. αj measured as the ratio 
of total wage bill over value added at the two or three digit industry level and averaged over the sample 
period. These produced similar results. 
( ) jtjjtjjt KLQMTFP ln1lnln αα −−−=
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(see Figure 18). Comparing the evolution of labor productivity dispersion and TFP 
dispersion, we find that the two series follows each other very closely21. 
Since the sorting models do not predict such as rise in TFP, we view this as 
giving some support for the technology-based explanations of Caselli (1999) and 
others. 
 
 5.2. Transitory Shocks 
Statistically, a rise in the cross sectional dispersion of firm productivity could 
arise purely from an increase in the transitory productivity shocks hitting firms22. The 
environment may have become more volatile for firms due to globalization, 
liberalization of product markets and/or financial markets. Some analyses of listed US 
firms have claimed that the variance of firms’ sales growth has increased over time23. 
Since productivity tends to rise with positive demand shocks (see Figures 5a and 5b, 
for example), perhaps the increased variability of firm-demand then maybe this could 
account for the patterns in the data. 
We analyze this hypothesis by looking at transition probability matrices of 
labor productivity, TFP, wages and profits. Our objective is to investigate whether 
increasing productivity dispersion over time simply reflects increasing firm mobility 
across points in the productivity distribution. We consider productivity deciles and 
construct transition probability rates for the distributions of labor productivity over 
the years 1986-2001. We compare transition probability rates between 1986/87 and 
1988/89 (the “early period”), between 1992/93 and 1994/95 (the “middle period”), 
                                                 
21 Interestingly, between-industry effects are slightly more important in explaining variation in TFP 
than in labor productivity. While they explain 17% of the increase in labor productivity dispersion, they 
account for 25% of the variation in TFP. 
22  Dickens (2000) or Blundell and Preston (1998) are examples showing that the increase in wage and 
income inequality are partially driven by increases in the transitory component. 
23 See the debate between Comin and Philippon (2005) and Davis et al (2006). 
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and between 1998/99 and 2000/01 (the “late period”)24. We pool the data into two-
year blocks and compute the transition probabilities between adjacent blocks of years. 
For example, in the early period we pool data for the same firms between 1986 and 
1987 to calculate the firm’s position in the productivity distribution in “t”, and then do 
the same exercise for the firms in 1988 and 1989 (t+1). We then compare where firms 
in each decile of the distribution in t ended up in t+1 (including the state of exiting 
from the sample). 
It can be misleading to compare transition probabilities rates at different points 
of the business cycle, because recession (expansion) years are characterised by an 
unusual number of firms exiting (entering) the market. Given our way of shaping the 
data, the early and late periods correspond to a roughly similar position in the 
business cycle. The middle and late 1980s were expansionary years as well as the 
middle and late 1990s. The early 1990s were recession years. 
The results are summarized in Table 1 for the top and bottom deciles (the full 
matrices for labor productivity are in Table 2)25. We focus on the probability that a 
firm stays in the same decile it began with, and measure a decrease in this probability 
as indicating a rise in mobility. Unsurprisingly, firms that start in the top decile of the 
productivity distribution tend to stay there. In the early period, for example, 60% of 
firms who were in the top decile of the productivity distribution were still in the top 
decile two years later. Similarly, 46% of the firms who began in the bottom decile of 
the productivity distribution were still there two years later (this underestimates the 
persistence because the least productive firms are disproportionately likely to exit the 
dataset as we show in Table 2). This is a much higher frequency than would be 
                                                 
24 We pooled data in order to keep the cell sizes reasonably large for the decile analysis. Other 
grouping lead to similar findings. 
25 We condition on the sub-sample of firms that appear in two consecutive years. 
 
 
20
expected by random fluctuations suggesting that productivity differences are 
persistent over time.  
The key column for our purposes is column (4) of Table 1 that compares the 
early and late years (these are at similar points in the business cycle). There is a very 
small increase of firms at the bottom of the productivity distribution moving up: only 
45% of firms in the bottom decile stayed there in the late period, a one-percentage 
point fall from the early period. Similarly, the most productive firms were two 
percentage points less likely to stay in the top decile in the late period relative to the 
early period (58% down from 60%). So mobility has increased, but only by a small 
amount. 
The next rows of Table 1 perform the same exercise for TFP. For the least 
productive firms, there is an increase in mobility between the early and the late 
period. In the late period, 59% of the firms in the bottom decile of the productivity 
distribution were still there two years later (compared to 61% in the early period). 
However, the opposite is true for firms at the top: they show a decrease in mobility 
(50% up from 47%). As with labor productivity there is no sign of a large increase in 
mobility: although mobility rates have increased slightly for the bottom decile by two 
percentage points, they have declined at the top decile by three percentage points. 
We also investigated transitions for average wages and productivity. Looking 
at average wages, we find some increase in mobility between the early and the late 
period. This is true for firms both at the top (six percentage points) and at the bottom 
(four percentage points) of the wage distribution. This finding is not surprising and is 
also consistent with the results obtained by Dickens (2000) and Blundell and Preston 
(1998). Looking at average profits, we find an increase in mobility at the top only, 
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with a decrease in mobility at the bottom. The decrease at the bottom (four percentage 
points) outweighs the increase at the top (two percentage points). 
Overall, then it appears that there is no evidence of a substantial increase in 
the transitory productivity shocks facing firms, implying that this is not the main 
explanation for the increase in the cross-sectional productivity distribution. 
Table 2 shows the transition matrices in full detail. Because we have many 
small firms there is a lot of exit26, especially for the least productive firms. In the early 
period, for example, 30% of firms in the lowest productivity decile exited compared 
to 20% in the highest productivity decile. This pattern of greater exit probability for 
the less productive firms is unsurprising as is the greater level of exit during the 
middle period in the early 1990s when demand was low. This prompts the question of 
whether these differential exit and entry patterns explain the aggregate increase in 
productivity dispersion.  
5.3. Exit and Entry of Firms 
One possible explanation of the rise in productivity dispersion that we observe 
could be that there was a rise in productivity dispersion among entrants. If entry 
barriers have declined due to liberalization or improved access to finance, for 
example, then a wider variety of entrants could enter the market with higher levels of 
productivity dispersion than previous cohorts27. In principle, incumbents could have 
no increase in dispersion. 
We analyse cohorts of new entrants and incumbents for the early (1987-1989), 
middle (1993-1995) and late (1999-2001) periods. We then look at the evolution of 
                                                 
26 Note that exit includes exits to bankruptcy as well as exits due to takeovers. Takeovers are less likely 
to be a signal of under-performance than bankruptcy. 
27 Of course, the tougher competition associated with lower entry barriers could reduce productivity 
dispersion if the least productive firms exit. Similarly, lower entry barriers may mean that less efficient 
forward looking firms rationally choose not to enter assuming they can observe their productivity in 
advance of entry. 
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the top half (90th-50th differential) and the bottom half (50th-10th differential) of the 
labor productivity distribution. Table 3 shows that entrants are indeed more dispersed 
in terms of productivity than incumbents. In the early period, for instance, dispersion 
in the top half of the distribution was 0.92 for entrants and 0.79 for incumbents. This 
pattern has also been found in similar datasets for other countries. There has not been 
an increase in aggregate entry rates, however, so this finding by itself could not 
account for the increase in aggregate productivity dispersion28.  
Looking at changes in the productivity dispersion of entrants between the 
early and late periods, we do see that there has been an increase: the differentials have 
increased by seventeen log points and thirty-one log points in the top half and bottom 
half, respectively. Nevertheless, we also see an increase in the productivity inequality 
of incumbents.  Productivity inequality for the top half has increased at a similar rate 
for entrants and incumbents (0.17 vs. 0.15). More interestingly, the 50-10 has 
increased faster for entrants (0.31 vs. 0.11). So this suggests that increased 
heterogeneity of entrants may have some role to play in accounting for the increase in 
“lower tail” (but not upper tail) productivity inequality.  
We also conduct a further check in Table 4. We exclude all entrants and 
exiters, and we look at the evolution of productivity dispersion for two balanced 
panels of “continuing” firms (i.e. those who were alive throughout the period 1984-
2001 and those who were alive throughout the period 1990-2001). We find that there 
is an increase in productivity dispersion even among continuing firms, suggesting that 
entrants are not the only cause of the rise in productivity dispersion that we observe 
within the economy.  
                                                 
28 The higher overall entry rates in the early period are due to the fact that there was strong cyclical 
growth in the late 1980s and much merger and acquisition activity.  
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5.4. The role of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in 
explaining the growth in productivity dispersion within industries 
In the previous sections we discussed and systematically eliminated alternative 
explanations for the rise in productivity dispersion within the UK economy (i.e., more 
sorting between firms, a rise in transitory shocks, and a rise in productivity dispersion 
among entrants). As a consequence, we consider technical progress the most likely 
cause and in this sub-section, we directly examine the role of ICT may have in 
explaining the growth in within-industry productivity dispersion. 
ICT information at the firm level does not exist for a long enough time period 
to perform a micro-analysis (See Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2007, for a 
discussion). We can, however, evaluate the impact of ICT on within-industry 
productivity growth using the Bank of England Industry Dataset29 (BEID) which 
contains information on ICT services, total capital services, hours of work, output, 
value added, etc. at the two-digit industry level.  
We use FAME data to compute the between-firm dispersion of labor 
productivity. We measure this as the 90-10 differential in log (real value added per 
employee) within each industry and calculate the change between 1984-1988 and 
1996-2000. We regress this long-difference change in productivity dispersion on the 
change in ICT intensity and various controls. 
The first column of Table 5 simply presents the bivariate regression between 
the change in productivity dispersion and ICT intensity revealing a large and 
statistically significant coefficient on ICT. A 10% increase in the share of ICT capital 
in total capital services is associated with a 2.7% increase in the dispersion of labor 
productivity. Column (2) includes a dummy for the manufacturing sector. As we 
                                                 
29 See Oulton and Srinivasan (2003). We thank Nick Oulton for making this data available to us. 
 
 
 
24
would expect given the earlier analysis, the dummy is significantly negative 
indicating that even conditional on ICT the growth in productivity dispersion is lower 
in manufacturing. Column (3) includes additional controls for the growth of total 
capital services per hour, the growth of the proportion of workers with college degrees 
and the change in union density (the proportion of workers who are members of trade 
unions). Including these extra controls reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on 
ICT intensity, but it remains significant at the 5% level. The other variables take their 
expected signs. Capital intensity is positive and significant which is consistent with 
the idea that some technology is embodied in non-ICT capital. ICT capital growth 
could be reflecting the growth of skills, which is why we condition on human capital 
– the variable is positive and significant. Institutional explanations of the rise in 
inequality emphasis that union decline may allow low wage/low productivity firms to 
survive. The union coefficient is indeed negative but it is insignificantly different 
from zero. 
We were concerned that the observed increase in dispersion may be due to the 
problem that hours are not available at the firm level. Increased dispersion of 
productivity could simply reflect increased dispersion of hours worked. To control for 
this we calculated the dispersion of hours worked in each industry using individual 
level data from the NES (in column (4)) and the Labor Force Survey (in column (5)). 
These variables were both insignificant and did not affect the coefficient on ICT 
intensity. We also included other demographic controls (female workers and part-time 
workers) as possible correlates with the increased use of ICT capital (and as factors 
that could affect labor productivity). Again, the ICT coefficient remains significant.  
In summary, after controlling for various factors, the positive association 
between increases in productivity dispersion and changes in ICT intensity still holds. 
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The ICT variable is economically as well as statistically significant. ICT intensity has 
grown very rapidly over this period (from 3.4% of all capital services in 1984-1988 to 
15% in 1996-2000). Given the estimated coefficient we can essentially account for all 
of the increase in productivity dispersion (0.266 points) by the increase in ICT 
intensity30.  
 
 
5.5. International Data 
If the growth of productivity inequality was technology based we would 
expect to observe this in other countries. In particular, France and Norway where 
there has been little change in wage inequality (e.g. Machin and Van Reenen, 2007). 
Figure 19 shows us the situation in France between 1989 and 2000 (we chose these 
years because we have consistent data). Interestingly, like the UK, there has been a 
clear increase in the variation of productivity over this period. Note, however, the y-
axis scale is much narrower than in previous graphs. Productivity has grown by about 
10% for firms at the 90th decile and has fallen by 10% for firms at the lower decile. 
The median firm has experienced productivity growth of about 5%. This is in the 
same direction as the UK, but the rise in productivity dispersion has been less 
dramatic. 
Figure 20 shows the situation in Norway in the 1995-2002 period (the only 
period for which we have value added per worker information in non-manufacturing 
as well as manufacturing). There has been a small growth in the 90-10 decile ratio 
over this period. Interestingly this increase is confined to the upper part of the 
                                                 
30 See Table A2. ln(ICT services/capital services) increased by 1.605 over this period so the implied 
“effect” is 0.37, more than 100% of the observed change.  
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distribution (the 90-50); the lower half of the distribution has shown some small 
decrease in inequality.  
It is well known that inequality of wages in France and Norway has also 
grown more slowly than in the UK or US in the last 25 years. So although the 
increase in productivity dispersion is not unique to the UK, it seems more muted in 
countries where there has been a slower growth of wage inequality. This suggests that 
institutional factors may play a role in the change of productivity dispersion.  
 
5.6. Quantification: How Important are the results for the wage 
distribution? 
How important could the change in the structure be in explaining the change 
in the wage distribution? We have not yet written a formal general equilibrium model 
of the simultaneous determination of the wage and productivity distribution31  so all 
we can do is to give some intuition over the magnitudes. Appendix C gives a simple 
model that could help us estimate some of the magnitudes. The model assumes that 
productivity is driven by technological factors and that wages are determined by a 
mixture of human capital characteristics and firm characteristics. Our model allows us 
to estimate the impact of the changing productivity dispersion on wage dispersion as: 
)var(ln
lnvar
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β                                                      (3) 
Between 1984 and 2001 the variance of ln(productivity) rose by 0.26 and the 
variance of firm ln(wages) rose by 0.21. If we assume that β  = 0.3 (e.g. Van Reenen, 
1996) then this implies that 10% of the increase in the variance of inter-firm wages is 
accounted for by the variance of inter-firm productivity. Therefore, this still leaves a 
                                                 
31 See Klette and Kortum (2004) or Lentz and Mortensen (2005) for an attempt to do this in the cross 
section. 
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big residual for such factors as the increase in the return to observable skills (and 
possibly increased sorting). Nevertheless, the increased productivity dispersion is a 
significant part of the story.  
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the between firm distribution of 
productivity could have become more important over time in accounting for the wage 
dispersion. Running wage regressions separately for different time periods reveals 
that β  has been increasing over time. For example, Table 6 reports specifications of a 
regression of wages on productivity with controls for time dummies and industry 
effects. We estimate separately for an early period (1984-1989), a middle period 
(1990-1995) and a late period (1996-2001). The first column reports simple OLS, the 
second column adds a full set of fixed effects and the third column reports GMM 
“System” estimates in the manner of Blundell and Bond (1998). All results show an 
increase in the importance of the effect of productivity on wage. For examples in the 
GMM estimates the coefficient rises from 0.325 in the mid 1980s to 0.382 in the late 
1990s. This suggests that firm heterogeneity has become more important in explaining 
the overall wage distribution.  
Although this shows that firm heterogeneity remains important for the wage 
distribution, it is difficult to estimate how important this phenomenon is for the 
overall increase in inequality. As Appendix C shows, the effect will depend on such 
hard to measure things as the variation of human capital and the degree of worker-
firm sorting (and the changes in these objects).  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined some evidence for the explanation of the 
growth of residual wage inequality. We have shown that a generally untested 
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implication of many technology-based theories of within group wage inequality is that 
there should be an increase in the dispersion of productivity between firms. We argue 
that existing studies will underestimate the importance of the growth of productivity 
inequality because they focus on the manufacturing sector that has experienced a 
surge of international competition truncating the lower tail of poorly performing firms 
and therefore compressing the (counterfactual) productivity distribution.  
Using new panel data on UK firms over the 1984-2001 period we show that 
the substantial increase in individual wage inequality is mainly a between firm (rather 
than within firm or between industry) phenomenon. More importantly we show that 
there has been a substantial increase in the between firm productivity dispersion. The 
90th percentile of the productivity distribution grew by 60 log points between 1984 
and 2001 whereas the 10th percentile grew by only 20 log points. Furthermore, we 
show that the increase was driven by the private service sector – the growth of 
dispersion in the manufacturing sector was muted. 
We examined several hypotheses that sought to explain the growth of the 
productivity dispersion. Overall, we conclude that the data gives some support for 
models along the lines of Caselli (1999) or Acemoglu et al. (2001). The diffusion of 
new technologies heterogeneously across firms has increased both the spread of 
productivity and the spread of wages. We found that those industries that had the most 
rapid increase in the use of ICT also had the most rapid increase in productivity 
dispersion. 
We argued that increases in the dispersion of inputs (such as ordinary capital) 
could not fully account for this pattern as TFP dispersion has risen - which implies 
that increased sorting is unlikely to be the main cause of the change. In addition, the 
pattern was not due to an increase in transitory shocks as the transition matrices 
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appear to be relatively stable at the beginning and end of the period. Thirdly, we 
showed that increased dispersion amongst entrants was not the only cause of the 
increased productivity inequality as productivity inequality grew even among 
survivors.  
The next steps in our analysis are to combine the information here with 
explicit measures of firm-level technology to test the theories more rigorously. Such 
data is available and is being constructed (Bloom et al., 2007). We also need to use 
more of the data from other countries, especially matched worker-firm data where we 
can do more to control for worker heterogeneity. Moreover, we need to address 
whether institutional or trade explanations have any purchase on the data. Finally, a 
tighter match with the theory of equilibrium wage and productivity dispersion is also 
a pressing need (e.g. Klette and Kortum (2004) or Lentz and Mortensen (2005)). This 
research is in progress. 
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Fig.1: Wage dispersion in private services
 
Source: New Earnings Survey Data, ln(annual wages), men 16-65. Private 
Services only. 
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Fig.2: Wage dispersion in manufacturing industries
 
Source: New Earnings Survey Data, ln(annual wages), men 16-65. 
Manufacturing sector only. 
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Source: FAME Company level data, ln(average annual wages). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FAME Company level data, ln(average annual wages). 
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Fig.4: Wage dispersion in manufacturing industries
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Fig.3: Wage dispersion in private services
 
 
36
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FAME Company level data, ln(value added per worker). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FAME Company level data, ln(value added per worker). 
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Fig.5b: Productivity dispersion in manufacturing and private services
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Fig. 5a: Productivity dispersion in the whole economy
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Source: FAME Company level data, ln(value added per worker). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FAME Company level data, ln(value added per worker). 
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Fig. 7: Productivity dispersion in manufacturing industries
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Fig. 6: Productivity dispersion in private services
 
 
38
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
1984 1989 1994 1999
year
total variance between component
within-firm component
NES and FAME Datasets 1984-1999.
Manufacturing and private services
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Fig.9: Decomposition of wage dispersion
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Fig.10: Decomposition of wage dispersion
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Fig.11: Decomposition of wage dispersion
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Fig.12: Decomposition of wage dispersion
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Fig.13: Decomposition of wage dispersion
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Fig.14: Decomposition of labour productivity dispersion
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
1984 1989 1994 1999
year
between-firm within-industry comp. between-industry comp.
NES weights.
Private Services
Fig.15: Decomposition of labour productivity dispersion
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Fig.16: Decomposition of labour productivity dispersion
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Fig. 17: Capital per worker dispersion in the whole economy
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Figure 19: Change in French Productivity Dispersion (Value added per worker), 
whole economy, 1989-2000 
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Fig.18: TFP in the whole economy
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Table 1: Transition probability matrices: summary of the results 
 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is defined as log (real value added /employment). We compare the 
transitions between (two year) periods by decile (see Table 2 for the full matrix for labor 
productivity). For example, the element in the first row and column indicates that 60% of the 
firms who were in the top decile of productivity in the 1986-1987 period remained in the top 
decile in the 1988-1989 period. Column (4) is the absolute difference between columns (3) 
and (1). Column (5) is the absolute difference between columns (3) and (2).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Early Middle Late Total 
change 
Δ Late to 
Middle 
 From 1986/87 
to 1988/89 
From 1992/93 
to 1994/95 
From 1998/99 
to 2000/01 
Δ (2000/01 -
1986/87) 
Δ (2000/01 -
1992/93) 
Labor 
Productivity 
     
1st decile 0.60 0.48 0.58 -0.02 0.10 
10th decile 0.46 0.38 0.45 -0.01 0.07 
TFP (α=firm 
weights) 
     
1st decile 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.03 0.06 
10th decile 0.61 0.52 0.59 -0.02 0.07 
Average 
Wage 
     
1st decile 0.59 0.50 0.55 -0.04 0.05 
10th decile 0.60 0.52 0.56 -0.06 0.04 
Average 
profits 
     
1st decile 0.60 0.48 0.58 -0.02 0.08 
10th decile 0.25 0.19 0.29 0.04 0.06 
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Table 2: Three-Year Transition Rates:  Labor Productivity 
 
     State in 1988-89 
 
     
State 
86-87 
1st 
 
2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th Exit 
 
Obs. 
1st  0.60 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.20 706 
2nd  0.10 0.38 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.20 706 
3rd  0.04 0.15 0.26 0.19 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.20 706 
4th  0.01 0.05 0.15 0.22 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.22 706 
5th  0.01 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.20 707 
6th  0 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.21 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.20 706 
7th  0 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.24 0.19 0.07 0.03 0.21 706 
8th  0.01 0  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.24 0.18 0.05 0.24 706 
9th  0 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.31 0.18 0.25 706 
10th  0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.46 0.30 707 
      State in 1994-95     
State 
92-93 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th Exit Obs. 
1st  0.48 0.11 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.35 810 
2nd  0.13 0.32 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.28 809 
3rd  0.03 0.14 0.25 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 0.27 809 
4th  0.02 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.27 809 
5th  0.01 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.30 809 
6th  0 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.19 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.32 810 
7th  0 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.34 809 
8th  0 0 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.05 0.37 809 
9th  0 0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.24 0.15 0.38 809 
10th  0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.38 0.40 809 
     State in 2000-01     
State 
98-99 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th Exit Obs. 
1st  0.58 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.28 959 
2nd  0.11 0.36 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.26 959 
3rd  0.02 0.15 0.26 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.29 959 
4th  0 0.06 0.15 0.23 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.24 959 
5th  0.01 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.22 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.23 959 
6th  0 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.22 959 
7th  0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.23 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.24 959 
8th  0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.25 0.17 0.05 0.26 959 
9th  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.29 0.15 0.30 959 
10th  0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.45 0.34 959 
Notes: Labor Productivity is defined as log (real value added /employment). We compare the 
transitions between (two year) periods by decile (see Table 2 for the full matrix for labor 
productivity). For example, the element in the first row and column indicates that 60% of the 
firms who were in the top decile of productivity in the 1986-1987 period remained in the top 
decile in the 1988-1989 period. Column (4) is the absolute difference between columns (3) 
and (1). Column (5) is the absolute difference between columns (3) and (2). 
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Table 3: Labor productivity dispersion among entrants and incumbents 
 
Periods Entrants Incumbents 
 90th-50th  50th-10th  Obs. 90th-50th 50th-10th  Obs 
Early  
(1987-1989) 
 
.92 
 
.72 
 
5585 
 
.79 
 
.60 
 
7437 
Middle  
(1993-1995) 
 
.99 
 
.82 
 
5167 
 
.84 
 
.65 
 
9764 
Late  
(1999-2001) 
 
1.09 
 
1.03 
 
4180 
 
.94 
 
.71 
 
10367 
Δ(1987-
2001) 
.17 .31  .15 .11  
 
Notes:  90th -50th = differential between the 90th and 50th percentile of the productivity 
distribution; 50th -10th = differential between the 50th and 10th percentile of the productivity 
distribution. 
 
 
Table 4: Labor productivity dispersion – balanced panels 
 
Periods Balanced panel, 1984-2001 Balanced panel, 1990-2001 
 90th-50th  50th-10th  Median 90th-50th  50th-10th  Median 
84-86 0.68 0.50 2.96    
87-89 0.68 0.53 3.09    
90-92 0.60 0.55 3.07 0.72 0.60 3.09 
93-95 0.64 0.57 3.19 0.73 0.57 3.21 
96-98 0.74 0.58 3.24 0.79 0.60 3.28 
99-01 0.77 0.58 3.24 0.86 0.59 3.25 
Δ(1984-2001) 0.09 0.08 0.28 0.14 -0.01 0.16 
Notes:  90th -50th = differential between the 90th and 50th percentile of the productivity 
distribution; 50th -10th = differential between the 50th and 10th percentile of the productivity 
distribution. The balanced panel (1984-2001) contains 784 observations every year; the 
balanced panel (1990-2001) contains 2136 observations every year. 
 
 
48
Table 5: The role of ICT in explaining the growth in within- industry productivity dispersion 
 
Dep. Var.: Δ(Dispersion in labor productivity) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Δln(ICT services/total capital services) 0.266* 
(0.143) 
0.311** 
(0.147) 
0.230** 
(0.117) 
0.232* 
(0.124) 
0.292** 
(0.136) 
Manufacturing dummy  -0.356** 
(0.154) 
-0.166 
(0.133) 
-0.090 
(0.186) 
-0.141 
(0.167) 
Δln(total capital services/hours)   0.538* 
(0.319) 
0.403 
(0.273) 
0.184 
(0.317) 
Δ(proportion of workers with college degree)   0.368** 
(0.170) 
0.375 
(0.243) 
0.517** 
(0.237) 
Δ(union density)   -0.118 
(0.263) 
-0.282 
(0.388) 
-0.094 
(0.414) 
Δ(coefficient of variation in  
total actual hours of work - LFS) 
   -0.357 
(0.469) 
 
Δ(coefficient of variation in  
hours of work - NES) 
    -0.121 
(0.096) 
Δ(proportion of part-time workers)    0.223 
(0.183) 
0.141 
(0.167) 
Δ(proportion of female workers)    0.088 
(0.324) 
0.001 
(0.426) 
R2 0.10 0.17 0.36 0.44 0.49 
No. of observations 33 33 33 33 33 
Notes: These are OLS regressions using the Bank of England Dataset. All variable are in “long differences” between  1984-88 and 1996-2000. The dependent 
variable, Dispersion in labor productivity, is the  90-10 of log(value added per worker). Robust standard errors are in parentheses below coefficients. ). 
Regressions weighted by the industry size. Robust standard errors are in parentheses below coefficients. (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): significant at 
the 5% level; (***): significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6: Correlation between wage and labor productivity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Firm 
Performance 
Variable 
Ln(Value added 
per worker) 
Ln(Value added 
per worker) 
Ln(Value added 
per worker) 
 OLS Within Groups GMM (Blundell-
Bond, 1998) 
Early (1984-89) 0.385*** 
(0.002) 
0.240*** 
(0.002) 
0.325*** 
(0.028) 
Middle (1990-
1995) 
0.446*** 
(0.002) 
0.259*** 
(0.002) 
0.352*** 
(0.037) 
Late (1996-
2001) 
0.491*** 
(0.002) 
0.282*** 
(0.002) 
0.382*** 
(0.032) 
# of obs. 182,189 182,189 118,806 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficients are robust to heteroskedacity and 
arbitrary serial correlation (i.e. clustered by firm). (*): significant at the 10% level; (**): 
significant at the 5% level; (***): significant at the 1% level. GMM in column (3) conditions 
on having at least four continuous time series observations. Instruments used are ln(value 
added per worker) lagged t-2 and t-3 in the differenced equation and Δln(value added per 
worker) lagged t-1 in the levels equations. All columns include a full set of time dummies. 
Columns (2) and (3) include firm fixed effects.
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Appendix A:  Variance decomposition of the between-firm component 
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) and Dunne et al. (2004), we 
decompose wage dispersion into between-firm and within-firm components. Our 
objective is to measure the contribution of the between and within components in 
explaining wage inequality.  
Total variation in W = ln (wages) across workers is defined as V and can be 
divided into a within firm (VWF) and between firm (VBF) component: 
BFWF VVV +=                                                                         (A1) 
The between firm component can be further divided into a between industry ( BIV ) and 
within industry (but between firm) component ( BFIV ). This can be written: 
BFIBIWF VVVV ++=                                                                    (A2) 
More explicitly write the individual variance of wages as: 
 
∑∑∑∑∑∑ −+−=−=
k
jk
j i
jkijk
k j i
ijk WWWWWWV
22 )]()[()(  (A3) 
 
where Wijk is the ln(wage) for worker i at firm j in sector k, Wjk is the average 
ln(wage) at firm j in sector k and W is the mean wage across all workers in all firms 
and sectors. 
Multiplying and dividing the first term of the right-hand side of equation (A3) 
by Njk, (the total number of workers in firm j) and considering that the 
)()( WWNWW jkjk
i
jk −=−∑ , equation (A3) becomes: 
∑∑∑∑∑ −+−=
k j
jkjk
i jk
jkijk
k j
jk WWNN
WW
NV 2
2
)(
)(
 (A4) 
Equation (A4) can be written as: 
 
2
)(∑∑∑∑ −+=
k j
jkjk
k j
jkjk WWNVNV  (A5) 
Dividing through by N, the total number of workers in the economy, we obtain 
the decomposition of overall variation into within firm (WF) and between-firm (BF) 
components: 
2
)(11 ∑∑∑∑ −+=
k j
jkjk
k j
jkjk WWNN
VN
N
V  (A6) 
Define VWF as the employee-weighted variance of mean wages within firms and VBF 
denotes the employee-weighted variance of mean wages between firms. 
∑∑⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛= k jkj jkWF VNNV
1                                                                                         (A7) 
∑∑ −⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛= k j jkjkBF WWNNV
2)(1                                                                            (A8) 
Substituting (A7) and (A8) into (A6) gives us equation (A1). It is straightforward to 
show how this can be further decomposed into an industry specific component. 
The between-firm and within-firm variance terms in (A8) and (A7) cannot be 
isolated from individual surveys like the NES, although the NES does permit 
estimation of their sum, V. To isolate the components, we first calculate VBF directly 
from the wage data in a firm-level database, FAME. We then estimate the within-firm 
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wage variance as a difference between total variance and the between-firm component 
using equation (A1) 
)()(Wˆ NES FAMEWF WVVV −=                                                       (A9) 
 
where V(W NES) is the variance of measured wages in the NES and V(WFAME) is the 
variance of wages in FAME. By applying this straightforward approach, we assume 
that there is no bias resulting from measurement error in the NES32. 
                                                 
32 Our approach of using equation (A8) to estimate within-firm variance of wages relies on the 
assumptions that the variance of measurement error in the NES wage observations and the covariance 
between true wage and the NES measurement error are negligible. Testing these assumptions requires 
both employer-reported and worker-reported wages for a sample of workers. Unfortunately, we do not 
have employer-employee linked data for the UK. 
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Appendix B: Data and additional results 
 
B1. The Datasets used 
 
Firm level dataset - FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) 
 
This database consists of company account data for the United Kingdom as 
discussed in the main text. The main dataset we use is FAME (Financial Analysis 
Made Easy) which is a UK company-level panel data set available since 1982. In 
Britain, all incorporated companies are legally required to register their accounts at 
Companies House and given a unique registration number. Unlike the US, this 
includes not only companies listed on the Stock Exchange but also all unlisted 
companies. In 2003, we arranged a special purchase of this data with a private sector 
company (Jordan’s) that has converted this data into electronic form33. This is 
unbalanced panel data and includes all firms that had exited the database prior to 2003 
(by either bankruptcy or takeover).  
Under UK law, firms are also required to report a great deal more accounting 
information on their wage bills than in the US (where declaration of staff expenses is 
a voluntary item). Because of this, we are able to construct measures of average firm 
wages that are unavailable for most firms in the US public accounts.  
We define average firm wage as the log ratio of total remuneration over the 
number of employees. We define labor productivity as log real value added per 
worker. Value added is calculated as the sum of gross profits before tax and staff 
expenses (see Griffith, Harrison and Van Reenen, 2006). We also consider a 
definition based on sales minus estimates of intermediate inputs. 
We apply three different measures of total factor productivity (TFP): (1) TFP 
measured by the Solow residuals with fixed weights, (2) TFP measured by the Solow 
residuals with industry specific weights and (3) TFP measured by the Solow residuals 
with firm specific weights (this is the preferred measure used in the Figures). All 
financial variables are expressed in thousands of pounds sterling and deflated by the 
annual Retail Price Index (RPI). 
We made the following selections in the main analysis (selection biases 
discussed below) 
• We exclude firms whose main industry was in agriculture, fishing, mining, 
utilities, public administration, health, education, social work and finance 
(the “manufacturing and private services” sample). 
• We keep consolidated company accounts data. 
• We keep firms with at least 10 employees.  
The final sample of firms contains information on about 11,000 companies 
each year between 1984 and 2001. The database provides detailed information on 
employment, tangible fixed assets, sales, gross profits, profits before tax and the 
industry in which the firm is operating (as well as many other items from the balance 
sheet).  
In testing the incidence of transitory productivity shocks hitting firms (sub-
section 5.2) we compute transition probabilities matrices of labor productivity, TFP, 
average wage and average profits. We condition on the sub-sample of firms that also 
                                                 
33 Bureau Van Dijk (BVD) supplied AMADEUS which contains FAME as a UK sub-component 
(licensed from Jordan’s). Unfortunately only firms who died within the previous ten years are kept and 
AMADEUS was not very complete until around 1999. This is why we needed to deal directly with 
Jordan’s and arrange a dump from their mainframe. 
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satisfy the conditions that we have labor productivity values in a two-year periods. 
The two-year periods are 1986/87 and 1988/89 (“the early period”), 1992/93 and 
1994/95 (“the middle period”), 1998/99 and 2000/21 (“the late period”). The final 
sub-sample for the entry/exit analysis includes 7,062; 8,092 and 9,590 firms in the 
early, middle and late periods, respectively. 
 
The New Earnings Survey (NES) is an employer reported survey, conducted in 
April each year, of employees in employment in the UK. The sample frame, based on 
national insurance (NI) numbers, covers roughly 1% of all employees – some 200,000 
individuals each year between 1984 and 1999. Individuals can be matched across 
years by their National Insurance (NI) numbers to form a panel of employees in 
employment. Details on personal characteristics are limited, but there is a wealth of 
information on earnings, hours, industry, occupation, sector and region. We have 
access to the data for the years 1984 through 1999. 
 
In order to compute our measure of gross annual pay, (1) we exclude Northern Ireland 
from our sample, thus concentrating on a sample for Great Britain; (2) we select 16-
64 year old males and 16-59 year old females for which their pay and working hours 
are not affected by absence; (3) we compute gross annual pay by multiplying gross 
weekly pay by 52. Our sample consists of about 160,000 individuals each year. Wage 
variables are expressed in thousands of pounds sterling and deflated by the annual 
Retail Price Index (RPI).  
 
Datastream contains company accounts data for UK firms listed on the stock 
exchange. We exclude firms operating in the financial sector (SIC80 code: 814-832). 
The sample at our disposal consists of about 1,350 firms each year between 1983 and 
2001. We define average firm wage as real total remuneration per employee. We also 
define labor productivity as real value added per employee. We use the annual RPI as 
deflator. 
 
Regnskapsstatistikk (REGN data) are the statistics of accounts for non-financial 
joint-stock companies prepared by Creditinform and Statistics Norway. The accounts 
statistics are from the enterprises’ financial statements submitted annually to the 
Register of Company Accounts in Brønnøysund and cover in principle the entire 
population of non-financial joint-stock companies. Data are available from 1992 but 
the sample is incomplete before 1995. By selecting companies with at least 10 
employees, our sample consists of about 18,000 firms each year from 1995-2002.  We 
define average firm wage as gross pay per employee. We also define labor 
productivity as log real value added per employee. We use the annual CPI as deflator. 
 
Bank of England Industry Dataset (BEID). This is a two-digit industry level dataset 
covering all sectors of the economy. We drop public administration and defence so we 
are left with 33 sectors. (Results are robust to the exclusion of sectors 31 (Education) 
and 32 (Health and social work.) It is based on National Accounts data from the 
Census. The ICT data is based on the supply and use tables. The full list of industries 
is contained in Table A2. Descriptive statistics of the BEID dataset matched to FAME 
are in Table A3. 
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B2. Robustness of the findings to sample selection and choice of productivity 
measure 
 
In this sub-section we discuss the sensitivity of the findings to the sample selections 
(and other decisions) that we have made on FAME. 
 
Industry Selection 
We considered a sample with no exclusions based on industry (“whole 
sample”) as well as the main sample which drops various problematic sectors. These 
sectors are problematic either because they have been influenced by government 
control and/or because of difficulties in measuring productivity (financial services). 
The original data had some missing values on the industry codes of dissolved firms so 
we collected this information from other sources. Of the final sample, an average of 
6% of firms (which represent 1% of aggregate employment) had missing values on 
industry codes (see Table A.4 for details). 
To check the findings we contrast the dispersion trends for the “whole 
economy” sample with the “manufacturing and private services” sample. The levels 
of the firm and wage productivity distribution are given in Table A1 below. In Panel 
A we use the whole economy sample across all sectors and group years into an early 
(1984-89), middle (1990-95) and late (1996-2002) period. Mean real wages and real 
productivity grew at the 10th, median and 90th percentiles of the distribution. But 
inequality clearly grew too. The lower panel (B) shows the equivalent for the more 
restricted sample. Although there is less dispersion as a whole (as we would expect 
from drawing a more homogenous sample) the trends in inequality of wages and 
productivity are quite comparable to the larger sample. This similarity can also be 
seen from Figure 5a which contains the whole sample which is very similar to the 
trends when we drop the problematic industries (see Figure 5b). 
 
Using sales per worker instead of value added per worker 
Figure A1 uses sales per worker as an alternative measure of productivity to 
value added per head. Sales are a line item in the company accounts, but have the 
major disadvantage that they will be affected by intermediate materials. An increase 
in the intensity of material use will increase sales per worker even if value added per 
worker remains constant. This is particularly important in the retail and wholesale 
sectors where intermediates are a large share of revenue. 
The variation of sales per worker has increased over this period, but not to the 
same extent as value added per worker. In particular the increase in inequality has 
come from an expansion of the 50-10 whereas the 90-50 has remained pretty constant. 
We conclude that it is important to look at value added as the distribution of 
intermediates has changed systematically over time. 
 
Profit dispersion 
A related concern of using value added is that the increase in value added 
dispersion is mechanical because value added is partly composed of the wage bill. Of 
course, it is quite possible for individual wage dispersion to rise and between firm 
wage dispersion to stay constant if the rise in wage inequality was entirely within 
firms. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the other component of value added, gross 
profits directly to see if the variation in profits has risen. This is illustrated in Figure 
A2. We see that it is indeed the case that profit variability has raised substantially in 
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the data and the increase in productivity dispersion is driven by both an increase in the 
inter-firm wage and the inter-firm profit dispersion. 
 
 
FAME Sampling Frame 
Could our results be driven by some problem with the sampling structure of 
FAME? Although FAME is meant to be comprehensive, data errors cannot be ruled 
out as the data collectors did appear to become more efficient over time (we dropped 
the 1979-1983 data because the numbers of firms were too low to be representative of 
the cross section). The total number of firms in FAME rises over time, but this is also 
partly due to the booming business cycle after 1983. The fact that inequality rises 
consistently after 1987 when the number of FAME firms is very stable gives us 
confidence that this is not the case. 
Nevertheless, we tested the “sample composition” hypothesis in several ways. 
First, we turned to an entirely separate database, Datastream. The Datastream On-line 
service includes only listed firms (like Compustat) but has been running since 1968 so 
is much better established. It is comparable to Compustat in the US. The disadvantage 
of Datastream, of course is that it does not include unlisted firms. Consequently, 
whereas we have 11,000 firms a year in FAME we have around 1,500 firms a year in 
Datastream. 
Despite these limitations, we re-ran our analysis on the Datastream sample 
using the same variable and sample definitions as FAME. The results were similar, if 
not even stronger. Figure A3 gives the productivity dispersion graphs for the whole 
economy and is comparable with Figure 5 in the main text. The 90th percentile has 
increased value added per worker by 60 log points over this period, almost identical to 
FAME. This is all of the Datastream firms are contained in FAME and will generally 
be those at the top of the productivity distribution.  By contrast, the 10th percentile has 
experienced almost no productivity growth. This is a larger increase in dispersion than 
we observed in FAME. It is consistent with the Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and 
Miranda (2006) finding that listed firms in the US appear to be becoming more 
heterogeneous than unlisted firms (possibly due to greater turnover in the Stock 
Market as more volatile firms, such as biotechnology and software start-ups enter and 
exit). 
 When we split by sector, as usual we observe that the growth of inequality in 
the manufacturing sector (Figure A4) is much less than the growth of inequality in the 
services sector (Figure A5). Again, this is reassuring as it is consistent with the 
findings from the FAME database. 
 
Firm Size 
 We drop firms with less than ten employees because sales and employment do 
not need to be reported for these firms under UK accounting regulations. This could 
cause various types of selection bias. One test of this concern is to compare the 
variance trends with the 90-10 Figures. The percentiles of the firm distribution treat 
each firm as a separate unweighted unit, so dropping the small firms potentially 
makes a large difference. The variance calculations, however, weight a firm’s 
productivity by its employment size. Since the firm size distribution is highly skewed 
the missing firms will only have a small weight in the overall productivity distribution 
so are unlikely to have much effect on the results. 
As a second check on the sample composition of FAME we examined the 
changing size distribution by looking at employment. In 2002 the median firm had 
 
 
56
150 employees in FAME. We plot out the 90-50 and 50-10 of the log (employment) 
distribution in FAME in Figure A6. There has been some decrease in the size 
distribution at the higher end – the 90-50 has fallen, but there has been some widening 
of the size distribution at the bottom end as the 50-10 has risen. Overall, the 90-10 is 
about the same at the end of the period (4.02) as it was at the beginning of the period 
(4.11). We conclude that the firm size distribution has not become systematically 
more unequal over this period. This suggests that the sampling frame has not changed 
in FAME in a systematic way that would necessarily imply more heterogeneity on all 
measures.  
 
The lack of a trend in the size distribution also makes it unlikely that our 
results are due to changes in the degree of outsourcing by firms. A concern with using 
consolidated accounts is that firms may be focusing on smaller lines of business and 
outsourcing non-core functions. This would give the appearance of increased 
productivity dispersion even though all that is occurring is vertical fragmentation. The 
fact that the size distribution is reasonably stable makes this explanation unlikely. 
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Appendix C: Changes in the variance of wages and the role of firm productivity  
 
Assume that wages are determined partially by the worker’s value on the open labor 
market and partially by the performance of the firm that he or she is matched to. This 
type of equation is rationalised by a number of theoretical models of imperfect labor 
market competition (e.g. Mortensen, 2003; Layard et al., 2005). The wage equation is 
assumed to be: 
 
ttttttttt ahAHW βαβα +=+= lnlnln                                           (C1) 
 
where W is the average wage in the firm, H is the competitive wage for the workers 
(which depends on human capital) and A is the performance (i.e. the productivity of 
the firm). Small case letters denotes natural logarithms. Theory restricts 1,0 ≤≤ tt αβ . 
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In discrete time this becomes 
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So clearly, one way in which an increase in the productivity variation increases the 
wage dispersion is through the first term: ( ))var(2 tt aΔβ . The percentage of the increase 
in wage variation accounted for by this component is:
)var(ln
)var(ln2
W
A
Δ
Δβ . 
 
 
To obtain some more intuition on the other terms, consider the situation where the 
coefficients do not change over time (i.e. ββ =t  and αα =t ). In this case: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ),cov(2)var()var()var( 22 ttttt ahhaw Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ βααβ                   (C5) 
 
 
 
58
The variance of wages could increase because the variance of productivity has 
increased (the first term, ( ))var(2 taΔβ , or because the variance of the human capital 
has increased (the second term, ( ))var(2 thΔα ) or because the covariance of human 
capital and firm productivity has become more positive (the third term, 
),cov(2 tt ahΔβα ). The final explanation is equivalence to an increased sorting of 
“good firms” and “good workers” (Kremer and Maskin, 1996).  
 
Returning to the full decomposition in equation (C4) consider the model 
where tt βα −= 1 . Simplifying terms we can express this as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
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In the paper we show evidence that tβ  appears to have risen over time, suggesting the 
productivity distribution is becoming more important. However, we cannot say for 
certain whether this also contributes to increased inequality as it depends on the sign 
of the second line. Since most estimates put tβ <0.5 and assume ),cov( tt ah >0 the 
final term is positive.  
 
Unfortunately, the var(h) is essentially unobservable in our data so we cannot rule out 
the possibility that: ( ) 0),cov()21()var()1()var( <−+−− ttttttt ahha βββ  in which case the increase in 
the impact of productivity on wages would contribute to a fall in inequality. 
 
Using β =0.3 and the empirical average variances in our data var(w) = .23, var(a) = 
.55. Using (C1) and calculating the cross sectional variance residual var(h) = 0.37 - 
0.21*cov(h,a). To calculate the final line of (C6): 
 ( ) )var()1()var( tttt ha ββ −− = 0.3*0.55 - 0.7*(0.37 - 0.21*cov(h,a)) = -0.094 + 
0.147*cov(h,a). So in order for an increase in the β  to have a positive impact on 
wage inequality we need cov(h,a)>0.64, a high degree of the level of positive sorting 
between firms and workers. 
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Notes: “Productivity” is measured here by ln(sales per worker) instead of the more 
standard value added per worker used elsewhere in the paper. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Gross profits before all deductions (tax, interest, dividends and depreciation) 
per worker. 
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Fig. A3: Labour productivity in the whole economy
 
 
.8
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000
year
10th percentile (indexed) 50th percentile (indexed)
90th percentile (indexed)
Log real value added per employee.
UK Datastream 1984-2002
Fig. A4: Labour productivity in manufacturing industries
 
Notes: Data is from Datastream On-line company accounts database. This is a strict 
sub-sample of FAME as it only includes listed firms. 
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Fig.A5: Labour productivity in private services
 
Notes: Data is from Datastream On-line company accounts database. This is a strict 
sub-sample of FAME as it only includes listed firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 90-50 is the difference of the ln(employees) at the 90th percentile minus the 
50th percentile. 50-10 is the difference of the ln(employees) at the 50th percentile 
minus the 10th percentile. FAME sample. 
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 Table A1: Dispersion of firm average wage and labor productivity over time 
 
Panel A: all sectors 
 90th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
10th 
percentile 
90th - 10th  
differential 
Mean Variance No. of 
obs. 
Labor productivity (log real value added per employee) 
Early 
(1984-
1989) 
3.81 2.98 2.36 1.44 3.06 0.54 8803 
Middle 
(1990-
1995) 
3.96 3.11 2.42 1.55 3.16 0.60 10909 
Late 
(1996-
2002) 
4.21 3.27 2.50 1.71 3.33 0.69 10841 
Log real average wage 
Early 
(1984-
1989) 
3.17 2.70 2.21 0.95 2.69 0.19 8803 
Middle 
(1990-
1995) 
3.45 2.89 2.34 1.11 2.89 0.26 10909 
Late 
(1996-
2001) 
3.70 3.07 2.45 1.25 3.07 0.33 10841 
 
Panel B: manufacturing and private services 
 90th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
10th 
percentile 
90th -10th 
differential 
Mean Variance No.of 
obs. 
Labor productivity (log real value added per employee) 
Early 
(1984-
1989) 
3.77 2.99 2.39 1.38 3.06 0.49 7316 
Middle 
(1990-
1995) 
3.88 3.10 2.43 1.45 3.14 0.53 9468 
Late 
(1996-
2002) 
4.12 3.25 2.51 1.61 3.30 0.62 9554 
Log real average wage 
Early 
(1984-
1989) 
3.14 2.69 2.22 0.92 2.68 0.17 7316 
Middle 
(1990-
1995) 
3.41 2.88 2.35 1.06 2.87 0.23 9468 
Late 
(1996-
2001) 
3.65 3.06 2.45 1.20 3.05 0.29 9554 
Notes: In Panel A “All sectors” keeps all firms in FAME database with at least 10 employees 
1984 to 2001 and non-missing data on wages and value added. In Panel B we drop the 
agriculture, mining, utilities, financial services, health and education sectors.  
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Table A2: List of industries in the Bank of England Industry Dataset (BEID) 
 
List of industries and their definitions 
Number Name SIC92  Industries used in Table 5 
1 Agriculture 01,02,05  √ 
2 Oil and gas 11,12  √ 
3 Coal & other mining 10,13,14  √ 
4 Manufactured fuel 23  √ 
5 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 24  √ 
6 Non-metallic mineral products 26  √ 
7 Basic metals & metal goods 27,28  √ 
8 Mechanical engineering 29  √ 
9 Electrical engineering & 
electronics 
30,31,32,33  √ 
10 Vehicles 34,35  √ 
11 Food, drink and tobacco 15,16  √ 
12 Textiles, clothing & leather 17,18,19  √ 
13 Paper, printing & publishing 21,22  √ 
14 Other manufacturing 20,25,36,37  √ 
15 Electricity supply 40.1  √ 
16 Gas supply 40.2,40.3  √ 
17 Water supply 41  √ 
18 Construction 45  √ 
19 Wholesale, vehicle sales & 
repairs 
50,51  √ 
20 Retailing 52  √ 
21 Hotels & catering 55  √ 
22 Rail transport 60.1  √ 
23 Road transport 60.2,60.3  √ 
24 Water transport 61  √ 
25 Air transport 62  √ 
26 Other transport services 63  √ 
27 Communications 64  √ 
28 Finance 65,66  √ 
29 Business services 67,70,71,72,73,74  √ 
30 Public administration & defence 75  X 
31 Education 80  √ 
32 Health & social work 85  √ 
33 Water treatment 90  √ 
34 Miscellaneous services 91-99  √ 
 
Source: Oulton and Srinivasan (2005)  
 
 
64
 
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics of the data used in the industry regressions 
 
Series 1984-88 
average 
1996-00 
average 
Δ(1984-88 
1996-00) 
90th-10th differentials in log(labor productivity) 1.36 1.63 0.266 
90th-10th differentials in log(average firm wage) 0.801 1.05 0.260 
Real ICT capital services /total real capital 
services 
0.034 0.151 0.117 
Total real capital services/total hours of work 0.009 0.014 0.005 
Proportion of workers with higher degree 0.082 0.145 0.063 
Union density share 0.498 0.331 -0.167 
Proportion of individuals employed part-time 0.126 0.143 0.017 
Proportion of workers who are females 0.315 0.338 0.022 
Coefficient of variation in basic hours of work 
(NES) 
0.063 0.08 0.017 
Coefficient of variation in total actual hours of 
work (LFS) 
0.126 0.123 -0.003 
    
 
Note: These are taken from the sample of 33 two digit industries used in the Bank of England 
Industry Dataset (BEID).  
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Table A.4: Summary Statistics, FAME Dataset, 1984-2001 
 
Year No. of firms Number of employees of firms in the sample 
1984 5,244 9,234,232 
1985 7,082 10,441,836 
1986 7,859 10,714,181 
1987 8,849 11,077,291 
1988 10,279 11,828,257 
1989 10,887 12,384,826 
1990 11,176 12,654,988 
1991 10,852 12,456,892 
1992 10,485 11,817,806 
1993 11,205 12,320,312 
1994 11,125 11,356,830 
1995 10,564 11,488,408 
1996 10,839 11,540,081 
1997 10,958 11,804,507 
1998 11,153 12,107,974 
1999 11,293 12,753,770 
2000 11,173 13,144,882 
2001 11,166 12,987,585 
 
Source: FAME Dataset 
Norges
Handelshøyskole
Norwegian School of Economics 
and Business Administration
NHH
Helleveien 30
NO-5045 Bergen
Norway
Tlf/Tel: +47 55 95 90 00
Faks/Fax: +47 55 95 91 00
nhh.postmottak@nhh.no
www.nhh.no
